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Introduction 
"Employers have no right to ask job applicants for their house keys or to read their 
diaries-why should they be able to ask them for their Face book passwords and gain 
unwarranted access to a trove of private information about what we like, what messages we send 
to people, or who we are friends with?" commented Senator Charles Schumer of New York.1 
This sentiment regarding online privacy is a popular one among legislators, with bills introduced 
in thirty-six state legislatures and Congress over the past two years aimed at protecting 
employees or job applicants from employers requesting access to social media websites? The 
current movement toward preventing employers from requesting passwords for social media 
websites arose primarily after controversies developed surrounding state governments requiring 
applicants' passwords.3 The first of these stories involved a governmental entity in Maryland 
demanding an applicant's Facebook password in 2011.4 Maryland soon thereafter became the 
first state to propose and pass a bill, which bans employers from accessing social media 
passwords and went into effect in October 2012.5 After several similar stories cropped up across 
the country, more states began to propose and enact these laws. Currently, six of the thirty-two 
1 Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, Employer Demands for Face book and Email Passwords as Precondition 
for Job Interviews may be a Violation of Federal Law; Senators Ask Feds to Investigate (Mar. 26, 2012) (on file at 
http://www .schumer.senate.gov/N ewsroom/record.cfm ?id=3363 96). 
2 National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013 
(2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx. These 
numbers are those at the time of publication. 
3 Lynne Bernabei & Alan R. Kabat, Invasions of Privacy; Congress and state legislatures are properly barring 
employers' demands for social-media passwords, 34 NAT'L L.J. 42,42 (2012). 
4 Jd 
5 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 EWest2012). 
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states that have proposed such legislation, California, Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, 
and New Jersey, succeeded in enacting laws in 2012.6 
Although an increased number of stories have been published regarding employers 
demanding Face book passwords, there are questions as to the actual extent of the practice and 
1 • ~ 1 1 1 • • 7 ~ ~ ~ • ~ ~ • 1 1 ·~. ~ 
the necess1ty tor such laws at thls trme. · ~everall<ey 1ssues underscore tne questionable utlllty ot 
these laws. First, the laws themselves are difficult to enforce, with no one defmed administrative 
mechanism or specific execution provision. Second, the acts are preemptive and lack substantive 
facts or figures to warrant their passage. Third, employers already have an incentive to not 
request access to an employee's online information in order to protect themselves from 
discrimination, privacy, and other labor and employment-related lawsuits. Additionally, these 
laws are not necessary to protect the employees or applicants who are asked for online 
usernames and passwords and later fired or not hired based on social media information, since 
those employees and applicants have other well-established means of protection such as privacy 
torts, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"), and the First Amendment. 8 
Despite these concerns regarding the recent legislation, state legislatures continue to 
propose and pass these laws with ease, seemingly as an attempt to help those employees and 
applicants. Meanwhile, many of the states are themselves the primary entities that have created 
these online privacy issues in the first place in local government hiring.9 State legislatures, rather 
than passing wide-reaching laws that are not necessary, should use their energy to enact 
6 National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2012 
(20 13 ), http://www .ncsl. org/issues-research/tel ecom/ emp }oyer-access-to-social-m edia-passwords.aspx. 
7 Shel Israel, The Great Facebook Employee Password Non-Issue, FORBES (Mar. 25,2012, 8:32PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/shelisraeV2012/03/25/the-great-facebook-employee-password-nonissue/. 
8 Stephen Hirschfeld & Kristin Oliveira, Keeping Facebookprivate; States and federal government are introducing 
legislation to prevent employers from requesting social media passwords, 136 THE RECORDER 16 (2012). 
9 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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legislation that regulates their own state and local agencies' employment guidelines.10 Private-
sector employers should be permitted to handle matters regarding the hiring and firing process 
themselves, guided by the legal risks and exposure that come with employment decisions which 
rely upon candidates' and employees' private online infonnation. 11 Since public and private 
sector employers have different methods, obligations, and risks associated with employment 
decisions, legislatures should not over-legislate and lump all employers together in these online 
privacy acts. 12 
This Note addresses the new legislative measures designed to protect employees' and 
applicants' online privacy, and highlights some of the concerns about the passage of these acts. 
The Note proceeds in three stages. Part I addresses the background of the various state and 
federal legislative proposals. This Part reviews the history and reasoning behind the legislative 
efforts, and dissects the laws themselves. Part II considers three concerns regarding the necessity 
of these laws. The first is the question of enforceability. The second issue focuses on the lack of 
evidence justifying these laws in the private sector. The third concern regarding this legislation is 
the absence of any legal need to impose regulations on private sector employers that are already 
protecting themselves from lawsuits by not requiring or even requesting online information from 
its employees or applicants. After addressing those three primary concerns regarding the 
necessity of these laws, Part III begins the analysis of how these three issues should affect the 
10 T.G. Allison Jr., Public and Private Management: Are they fundamentally alike in all unimportant 
respects, POLICY 1, Vol. 2, 14 (1983). 
11 Anna Hickman, Don't Bother Asking for Facebook Passwords, The Corporate Counsel Newsletter, 27 LAW 
JOURNAL NEWSLETTERS 7, 9 (Aug. 16, 2012). 
12 Joe Weisenthal, The Public Sector vs. The Private Sector in One Colossal Chart, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-the-public-vs-private-sector-2012-7; Allison Jr., supra note 10, at 14. These 
articles show that the private sector is much more financially stable and successful than the public sector. 
Additionally, there is a stark difference in managerial authority between the public and private sector. "The general 
management functions concentrated in the CEO of a private business are, by constitutional design, spread in the 
public sector among a number of competing institutions and thus shared by a number of individuals whose 
ambitions are set against one another." Allison, at 21-22. 
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passage of the legislation. Finally, this Note concludes that state and federal legislatures, rather 
than addressing the wide-spectrum of both public and private sector employers, should limit such 
legislation to only the public sector. There is yet to be a need for laws regarding online privacy 
information beyond the public sector where, as here, the other concerns of enforceability and 
means of protection for any injured employee or applicant outweigh the need for private sector 
regulation. 
Part I: Background 
This section addresses the background and history leading up to the proposal of 
legislation limiting access to employees' online information. Specifically, this section highlights 
the controversies publicized by the media that drew attention to and served as the catalyst to 
these legislative measures. This section also details the actual legislation in states that have 
passed limiting laws, the states that have proposed similar laws, and the proposed federal bills. 
Lastly, this segment provides an overview of the goals and reasoning behind the proposed 
legislation. 
A. History 
Before state legislatures and Congress proposed laws banning employers from requesting 
social media passwords from job applicants, several publicized controversies led to the demand 
for these legislatives measures. The first major issue occurred in Maryland in 2011 13 When the 
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services required the Facebook 
password of a corrections officer in his recertification process, supposedly attempting to 
determine whether the officer had ties to gang members. 14 The American Civil Liberties Union 
("ACLU") of Maryland took a stance against this new practice in a press release issued in 
13 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
I4Jd 
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February 2011.15 The ACLU also posted a YouTube video highlighting the story and requesting 
that the Department no longer request online passwords.16 In response, the Department did 
suspend the practice.17 Nevertheless, soon thereafter in May 2012, Governor Martin O'Malley of 
Mary land signed into law the online privacy act, proposed and passed by the Mary land 
legislature.18 This law was the first of its kind and marked the beginning of a nationwide trend.19 
A second controversy occurred in Bozeman, Montana in 2009, when the city government 
required all job applicants to provide usernames and passwords for social media sites, including 
Facebook, Google, Yahoo, MySpace, and YouTube.20 In June of2009, the city manager of 
Bozeman issued a statement suspending the city's requirement but only after the city government 
received many complaints from its citizens about this practice?1 On February 27,2013, 
Montana's state Senate passed a bill protecting private electronic information of job applicants 
and employees.22 The bill currently awaits a vote in the state House ofRepresentatives.Z3 
A third issue arose in Minnesota, when a young girl came forward saying that her public 
school demanded she provide her login information to Face book and email accounts?4 The girl 
said that the school asked for her passwords because of allegations that she was having 
15 Press Release, The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland, Want a Job? Password Please! (Feb. 14, 2011) 
(on file at http://www.aclu~md.org/press_room/40). 
16 Aaron C. Davis, Maryland corrections department suspends Face book policy for prospective hires, WASH. POST., 
Feb. 22, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011 022207486.html. 
17 ld 
18 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3~712 (West 2012). 
19 National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2012 
(20 13), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer~access-to~social-media-passwords.aspx. 
20 Declan McCullagh, Want a job? Give Bozeman your Facebook, Google Passwords, CNET, June 18,2009, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3~10268282-38.html. 
21 ld; David Pardo, Bozeman, Montana Suspends Controversial Requirement that Job Applicants Provide 
Usernames and Passwords to Facebook Accounts, SECURITY, PRIVACY AND THE LAw, July 15, 2009, available at 
http://www.securityprivacyandthelaw.com/2009/07/bozeman-montana-suspends-controversial-requirement-that-job-
applicants-provide-usernames-and-passwords-to~facebook~accounts/. 
22 S.B. 195, 63d Leg. (Mont. 2013). 
23 ld; National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords 2013 
(20 13 ), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media~passwords.aspx. 
24 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, ACLU-MN Files Lawsuit Against Minnewaska 
Area Schools (Mar. 6, 2012) (on file at http://www.aclu-mn.org/news/2012/03/06/aclu-mn-files-lawsuit-against-
minncwaska-arca-schools). 
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conversations about sex with another student.25 Supposedly, the school administrator informed 
the girl that she would be punished if she did not provide the information.26 The ACLU of 
Minnesota filed a lawsuit in 2012 against the girl's school district,27 the Minnewaska Area 
Schools, as well as the Pope County Sheriffs office for violating the constitutional rights of a 
minor student, speci:t1cally arguing that public entities violated the girl" s First Amendment right 
to free speech for off-campus behavior and her Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizures. 28 
Besides these issues that arose from state or local government actions, there has also been 
a general trend in the federal government requiring more detailed and in-depth information for 
job applicants?9 President Barack Obama created a more comprehensive vetting process for 
high-ranking executive branch applicants than previous, including requiring disclosure of any "e-
mail(s) that might embarrass the president-elect, along with any blog posts and links to 
their Facebook pages."30 Although the executive branch application did not require applicants to 
relay their username or passwords for social media websites, it did require information regarding 
25 ld 
26ld 
27 The school district and sheriffs office moved to dismiss, arguing that they did not violate the Constitution. The 
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota denied the motion to dismiss, holding that the girl's constitutional 
rights were established and the defendants' conduct could amount to violations. However, the Court also found that 
"certain claims advanced by the Plaintiffs-civil conspiracy to deprive [the minor] of her civil rights and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress-have not been sufficiently pled," and were thus dismissed. R.S. v. Minnewaska 
Area School District, Civ. No. 12-588,2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn.Sept. 6, 2012). 
28 Id; Complaint at 2, R.S. v. Minnewaska Area School District. (No. 12-588), 2012 WL 3870868, at* 1 (D. 
Minn.Sept. 6, 2012). 
29 See generally Jackie Calmes, For a Washington Job, Be Prepared to Tell All, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/us/politics/13apply.html?_r=2&. (discussing President Barack 
Obama's seven-page questionnaire, which included 63 requests for personal and professional records, for high-
ranking applicants for the President's first administration). 
3o Id 
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private Internet posts or e-mails.31 Thus, the federal government created a standard of all-
encompassing application inquiries, covering information from new forms of online data.32 
Each of these controversies arose out of requirements for information from a 
governmental entity.33 Each employer indicated that it asked for usemames and passwords to 
serve as a background check or guard against inappropriate behavior. "Before we offer people 
employment in a public trust position, we have a responsibility to do a thorough background 
check," said Chuck Winn, Bozeman, Montana's assistant city manager, when originally 
interviewed about the city's application requirements.34 Despite the trend toward government 
transparency, these acts raise some questions as to whether these requests are going too far. 35 
Thus, in reaction to these issues, specifically after the Mary land story came out, state legislatures 
decided it was time to take action. 36 
B. Legislative Overview 
As of the writing of this article, thirty-six state legislatures have now proposed or passed 
legislation banning access to social media passwords. 37 Congress has also proposed legislation of 
this kind.38 In 2012, six states enacted legislation that prohibits employers and/or schools from 
requesting an employee, student or applicant to disclose private online information- California, 
Delaware, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey.39 Eight other states proposed online 
31ld 
32ld 
33 See id at 4-5. 
34 McCullagh, supra note 20. 
35 Calmes, supra note 29. 
36 National Conference of State Legislatures, Employer Access to Social Media Usemames and Passwords 2012 
(20 13), http://www .ncsl.org/issues-research/tel ecom/ employer-access-to-social-media-passwords.aspx. 
37ld 
38 Password Protection Act of2012, H.R. 5684, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012); Social Networking Online Protection 
Act, H.R. 537, 112th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2012). 
39 CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:J-J2 (2012); New Jersey's state legislature passed the legislation unanimously in 
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privacy legislation in 2012: Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New York, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington.40 Utah is the only state, thus far, to pass its act in 
2013.41 An additional twenty-one states proposed laws in 2013: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and West 
Virginia.42 
Two separate acts were proposed in Congress in Apri12012: H.R. 5684, the Password 
Protection Act of 2012, and H.R. 5050, the Social Networking Online Protection Act.43 The 
Password Protection Act would prohibit employers from requiring job applicants and employees 
to provide access to their private online accounts.44 This act would apply to employers' use of 
any online password information as a condition of employment, discrimination, or retaliation.45 
The Password Protection Act would be integrated into the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 
which was an act "passed by Congress in 1984 to address the unauthorized access and use of 
computers and computer networks."46 The Social Networking Online Protection Act, 
alternatively, would prohibit employers and schools from requiring or requesting that employees, 
October, 2012. Martin Bricketto, NJ Senate Oks Bill Shielding Workers' Social Media Privacy, LAW360, Oct. 25, 
2012, http:/ /vv-vv-w .law360 .corrJarticles/3 g9441 /nj-senate-oks-bill-shieldiug-worke:rs-social-medja-privacy. 
40 H.D. 4323, (Mass. 2012); H.F. 2982, 87th Leg., (Minn. 2012); H.B. 2060, 97th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); 
S.B. 6938, 235th Leg. (N.Y. 2012); S.B. 351, 129th Leg. (Ohio 2012); H.B. 2332 (Pa. 2012); H.B. 1505, 119th Leg. 
(S.C. 2012); S.B. 6637, 62nd Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2012). 
41 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101- 34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012). 
42 S.B. 1411, 51st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013); H.B. 1901 & 1902, 89th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013); H.B. 
1046, 69th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 5690 (Conn. 2013); H.B. 149 (Ga. 2013); H.B. 713, 27th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2013); H.F. 272 (Iowa 2013); H.B. 2094 (Kan. 2013); H.B. 838, I 26th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 
2013); H.B. 165, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2013); S.B. 195, 63d Leg. (Mont. 2013); L.B. 58, 103rd Leg., 1st 
Sess. (Neb. 2013); A.B. 181, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2013); H.B. 414 (N.H. 2013); S.B. 371, 51st Leg., 1st Sess. 
(N.M. 2013); H.B. 1455, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013); S.B. 499, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013); S.B. 493 
(R.I. 2013); S.B. 416, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); S.B. 7 (Vt. 2013); H.B. 2966, 81st Leg., 1st Sess. (W.Va. 
2013). 
43 H.R. 5684; H.R. 537. 
44 H.R. 5684; Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
45 H.R.5684. 
46 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42(quoting Lewis and Roca LLP, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: 
'Authorization' in Flux and the Ninth Circuit Dilemma, Mar. 6, 2012, 
http://www Jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer .aspx?fid=75d0f5 3e-e6ce-4165-a5dd-6fcd64a984 70). 
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students, and job applicants provide a usemame or password to access a personal account on any 
social networking website.47 This act would create a stand-alone new law limiting access to 
private online information, rather than one combined with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.48 
C. Enforcement Techniques 
Of the seven states that have passed legislation banning access to online information, six 
now ban both employers and schools from "requesting or requiring" any usernames or passwords 
to online information.49 Delaware passed an act that banned only academic institutions from 
requiring online password information. 50 
Of these seven laws, only three of them have specified means of enforcing an employer's 
or school's actions. 51 Utah's Internet Privacy Amendments provide that an aggrieved individual 
may bring a civil cause of action, in which the court shall not award that individual with more 
than $500.52 Similarly, Michigan's Internet Privacy Protection Act provides that an individual 
can bring a civil suit and may recover not more than $1,000 in damages, with any reasonable 
attorney fees and court costs. 53 However, Michigan's Act also provides that a person who 
violates this Act is guilty of a misdemeanor. 54 Therefore, Michigan's Act takes a step further 
than Utah's and makes a violation a criminal action. 55 
47 H.R. 537; Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
48 Jd 
49 CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & E:l'v1PL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-
24-301 (2012). 
50 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012) 
51 CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-
24-301 (2012). 
52 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012). 
53 MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012). 
54 Jd 
55 Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-
24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012). 
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The only other state law that includes a specific violation and enforcement provision is 
New Jersey's, which again provides that an aggrieved individual may institute a civil action. 56 
Unlike Utah's and Michigan's Acts, however, New Jersey's does not include a specific amount 
of costs, but rather indicates that an individual is entitled to injunctive relief, compensatory and 
consequential damages, plus reasonable attorney fees and court costs. 57 
Thus, overall among the seven state laws that ban some sort of access to online 
passwords, four state laws have no specific enforcement provision, three allow for civil actions, 
two specify an upper limit for any award of damages, and one imposes criminal sanctions.58 
When it comes to enforcement provisions of the federal bills, both bills include more 
stringent and severe violation penalties. 59 Since the Password Protection Act would be 
interwoven with the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, enforcement provisions already exist. 60 
There are several penalties in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act depending on the violation, 
including both fmes and imprisonment from one to twenty years.61 The Social Networking 
Online Protection Act, on the other hand, is very clear that its remedy is a civil violation is 
actionable by the Secretary of Labor. 62 Additionally, an employer that violates the Social 
Networking Online Protection Act can pay a fine of no more than $10,000.63 Therefore, the two 
56 N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 (2012). 
57 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012), with MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), and 
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012). 
58 CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, §§ 9401-9405 (West 2012); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
55/10 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29-18A:3-32 {2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-
24-301 (2012). 
59 H.R. 5684; H.R. 537. 
6
° Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986). 
6lld. 
62 H.R. 537. 
63 Jd. 
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federal acts include provisions for harsher penalties and would allow for stricter enforcement via 
civil suit and the Secretary of Labor. 64 
D. Goals Behind Legislation 
Each of the proposed bills or enacted statutes provides some restrictions against 
employers requesting employees' or applicants' online passwords.65 
This legislation prohibits employers or schools from requiring employees, 
students or applicants to disclose their social-media passwords, or 
otherwise to provide access to private material on social-media Web sites. 
These legislative efforts also prohibit taking adverse actions against 
individuals who refuse to disclose their passwords.66 
Generally, employers are not able to gain non-workspace information without the employee's 
consent.67 The legislators do not seem to be convinced by entities' explanations that by gaining 
access to these personal accounts the employer is merely doing its due diligence and protecting 
itself against incompetence, negligent hiring lawsuits, and resume fraud. 68 Where the bills have 
been successful the state legislatures view gaining access to social media passwords as an 
invasion of an individual's privacy and as a result seek to protect employees from these requests, 
in addition to providing a remedy in case the law is not followed. 69 
Part II: Problems with Legislation 
This section of the Note presents arguments as to why state and Congressional efforts to 
ban the practice of requesting online and social media passwords are not necessary. The first 
reason is that the aforementioned bills-and undoubtedly copycat bills to come-are difficult to 
enforce without a distinct implementation mechanism and an assortment of remedies. Second, 
64 H.R. 5684; H.R. 537. 
65 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
66ld 
67ld 
68 Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
69 See generally id (parenthetical). 
11 
there is no clear proof of how many employers or government bodies are requesting these 
passwords, and not enough studies or statistics to glean the number of applicants affected by 
these password requests. Therefore, these legislatures are preemptively passing acts without 
proof of their actual necessity. Third, employers already have legal reasons to avoid seeking 
password-protected information- to protect themselves against lawsuits or legal claims. 
Employees or applicants who are required to provide social media access and then frred or not 
hired have means to protect themselves, including bringing a claim of invasion of privacy or 
discrimination against the employer. Thus, because an employer puts itself at risk for a lawsuit 
when requiring social media passwords, the passage of these acts is merely a further disincentive 
for employers to do something most are already avoiding. 
A. Difficulty of Enforcement 
An initial reason that laws banning employers from requesting an applicant's social 
media passwords are ineffective is the difficulty of enforcement. 70 There are several reasons why 
this legislation is difficult to enforce: (1) varying enforcement mechanisms creating uncertainty 
among the different state and congressional bills; (2) infeasibility of monitoring employers or 
governments; (3) lack offmancing for enforcement agency or function; and (4) the government's 
enforcement power over the employer outside the public-sector is uncertain?1 
A major problem with enforcement is that many of the current bills have differing 
enforcement mechanisms or are lacking them altogether.72 Bills from different states provide 
assorted enforcement actions, as discussed above.73 While some states, such as New Jersey and 
Utah provide private civil rights of action, other states, such as Michigan, create a misdemeanor 
70 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
71 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
72 See discussion supra Part I. C. 
73 ld 
12 
offense in addition to the civil and administrative remedies. 74 Additionally, Utah and Michigan 
provide limited damages that a court can award to an aggrieved claimant, while New Jersey sets 
no specific damage limit. 75 On the other hand, the bills proposed in other states, such as 
California, Maryland, Missouri, and South Carolina provide no enforcement mechanism 
whatsoever.76 In those states, an individual could presumably bring a tort claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy, and could use this legislation as the public policy basis?7 
In that case, a full range of remedies would presumably be available?8 These varying 
enforcement measures make it difficult for national employers to create and defend regulations 
for the company as a whole. In Michigan, the company may be up for criminal charges, while in 
Utah the company only has to pay a fine of $500?9 
The congressional bills would also be difficult to enforce. 80 Specifically, the Social 
Networking Online Protection Act "allows for enforcement only through the U.S. DOL, at a time 
when that agency lacks the resources to enforce other federal employment statutes."81 In addition, 
unlike in many of the state causes of action, the Social Networking Online Protection Act only 
allows the Secretary of Labor to bring an action, while most states allow only for private civil 
causes of action.82 This confusion again leads to difficulty for large national companies that span 
several or all states, for that company could get sued by an individual in one state and pay a 
74 Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012), and MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with 
UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012). 
75 Compare UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-24-301 (2012), and MICH. CoMP. 
LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012), with N.J. STAT. ANN.§§ 18A:3-29- 18A:3-32 (2012). 
76 CAL. LAB. CODE§ 980 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2012); H.B. 2060, 97th Leg., 
1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2012); H.B. 1505, 119th Leg. (S.C. 2012). 
77 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
78Jd 
79 MICH. COMP. LAWS§§ 37.271-37.278 (2012); UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 34-48-101-34-48-301 & 53B-24-101- 53B-
24-301 (2012). 
80 H.R. 5684; H.R. 537. 
81 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42; Kenneth Kopelman, Closing the Courthouse Door on Section 503 
Complaints; Davis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 49 BROOK. L. REV. 1159, 1176-77 (1983). 
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minimum fine, and later get sued by the Secretary of Labor and pay a much larger fine. In turn, 
the Password Protection Act, as mentioned above, which would amend the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, provides both civil and criminal means of enforcement.83 However, the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act covers a wide array of computer violations, and where the new amendment 
would fit in is unclear, specifically in regard to the enforcement section.84 
Another reason enforcement is impractical is because, where private suit is not 
authorized, it is nearly impossible for the government to regulate, watch, and monitor every 
employer in a certain jurisdiction. First, the United States has embraced an ideal that the Internet 
should primarily be self-regulated.85 Thus, the U.S. does not have a regulatory body for invasions 
of privacy when it comes to online information. 86 Additionally, the Department of Labor 
("DOL"), a department that could regulate this act federally, already "administers and enforces 
more than 180 federallaws."87 In a 2006 Performance and Accountability Report ("PAR"), the 
DOL assessed twenty-eight of its programs to determine each programs' effectiveness. 88 Out of 
the twenty-eight programs reviewed under the PAR, one was rated ''effective," eight were rated 
"moderately effective," twelve were deemed "adequate," and the last four were ranked 
83 H.R. 5684. 
84 Id. 
85 Privacy Int'l, Privacy and Human Rights 2003: Overview, http:// 
www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/overview.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2004); 
See generally Ryan Moshell, ... And then there was one: The outlook for a self-regulatory United States amidst a 
global trend toward comprehensive data protection, 37 TX. TECH. L. REV. 357 (2005) (discussing how the United 
States should develop a more comprehensive data-protection regime). 
86 See generally id 
87 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Summary ofthe Major Laws of the Department of Labor, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/aboutdoVlawsprog.htm. (GLOBAL: for these executive materials, see Rule 14 pg. 135. You 
can small-caps the Department name as well as the title, and then add the date). 
88 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DOL Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2006, Performance and Accountability Report 
(2006). 
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"ineffective."89 The DOL has also specifically admitted to ineffectively enforcing certain acts in 
the past.90 
A third major issue with enforcement is fimding. 91 In this economic circumstances that 
the United States now faces, the government is looking for measures to cut spending.92 "There 
surely are more economic shocks in store, including increased unemployment, more corporate 
defaults, and state and local government budget emergencies."93 In creating jobs or a government 
entity to oversee employers in regard to this new legislation, only a further buildup of resources 
and funding would occur in the public sector. But over the past year local, state, and federal 
government jobs have dropped by 162,800 jobs, a .7 percent decline.94 With declining job 
numbers in the government sector, and the goal to cut government spending, including a recent 
sequester, there is no money or manpower left to create an entity or pay more employees to 
monitor employers and their online information usage.95 
Combining the reasoning above, the recent legislative measures attempting to ban 
employers from requiring access to employees' or applicants' social media passwords are, 
overall, difficult to enforce. The variability amongst the state and federal legislations, the 
infeasibility of enforcement, the lack of funds needed to enforce these laws, and the question as 
89Jd 
9
° Kopelman, supra note 82, at 117 6-77. 
91 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A F AlLURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION (Harvard Univ. Press, 2009). 
92 See Eamon K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 
5 (2009). 
93 Jd at 10. 
94 G. Scott Thomas, Government employment drops by 162,800 jobs, THE BUSINESS JOURNALS (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/on-numbers/scott-thomas/2012/08/government-employment-drops-by-
162800.html. 
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to whether it should be the government's responsibility to monitor these employers lead to the 
impracticability of implementing these laws, both administratively and functionally .96 
B. Preemptive Legislation 
Many of the controversies surrounding the password requests occur in state government 
entities. 97 But, rather than the states handling these issues with state government policies, 
specifically hiring policies, the states decided to legislate against these practices in both the 
public and private sectors.98 Beyond these state or local government accounts, there is reason to 
doubt that many companies, employers, or schools are requesting online passwords.99 Shel Israel, 
ofF orbes states that 
There is real question as to how widespread such practices really are. The 
number of cases reported so far appears to have three aspects in common: 
(1) They involve government positions, most of them public safety jobs. 
This does not justify the privacy invasion, but may explain overreaction by 
employers who really do need to worry about security. (2) All incidents 
being reported are more than a year old. (3) As far as I could find, there is 
not a single report of passwords being demanded by private sector 
companies.100 
In his article, Israel argues that these online privacy bills are proposed without any proof as to 
how many people are affected. 101 Specifically, he states that this is a non-issue that has been 
Though there are not many statistics, or much evidence, revealing how many employers 
are requiring passwords or how many applicants are affected by this practice, there are some 
indicators that point to a lack of any problem regarding access to private online accounts, 
especially within the private sector. In Senator Schumer's press release asking the U.S. Equal 
96 See discussion supra, Part II. A. 
97 See Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3; see also, discussion supra P. II, 3-6. 
98 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3. 
99 Israel, supra note 7. 
100 Jd. 
IOIJd. 
I02Jd. 
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Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC,') and the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") to 
investigate the recent activity of employers requiring online passwords, he cited "recent reports" 
showing that "some" employers were requiring disclosure of passwords.103 The "recent reports" 
that the press release makes reference to are three media stories to individual narratives.104 
In one case, the Associated Press reported a New York City statistician 
was asked for his Facebook usemame and password so that the employer 
could review private components of his profile as part of the interview 
process for the job he was applying for. At least two other cases were 
identified where individuals who were applying for jobs were required to 
tum over Facebook passwords and usemames in order to be considered for 
the job they were applying for, as well as a city that, until recently, 
required job applicants to provide access to their email accounts.105 
These three accounts were the only factual bases used for Senator Schumer's report regarding the 
practice of requesting or requiring online passwords in New Y ork.1 06 
In fact, when it comes to available statistics regarding how many employers are requiring 
an online password, there are not many studies in existence. In one poll, however, of over 1,000 
high-level companies completed by Littler Mendelson, P.C., fewer than one percent of those 
companies said that they had "requested social media logins as part of the hiring or on boarding 
process."107 Though this does not cover all companies, it strongly suggests that almost none of 
the most successful private sector entities are requesting social media passwords.108 
103 See Press Release, Senator Charles Schumer, supra note 1. 
104Jd 
105 Jd. 
I06Jd 
107 Littler Mendelson Executive Employer Survey Report15 (June 2012), 
http:/ /shared.littler .com/tikit/2 0 12112_ EE _survey_ communication/Littler_ Mendelson_ Executive_ Employer_ Survey 
_Report_2012.pdf. Out ofthe 1,000 high-level companies, the respondents were comprised of seven percent C-suite 
executives, 45 percent in-house attorneys, 41 percent human resources professionals, and seven percent other 
professionals.Jd at 17. Additionally the sizes of the companies were comprised of21 percent LargeCap, or greater 
than four billion dollars in market capitalization; 21 percent MidCap, or one to four billion in market capitalization; 
36 percent Small Cap, or less than one billion in market capitalization, and 22 percent did not respond with particular 
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This is not the first time, however, that legislation has been enacted to deal with a 
supposed problem without statistics and evidence to document the existence of the problem in 
the first place .. 109 A recent act passed preemptively was the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA"), 110 which was passed by Congress in 2008 to prohibit 
employers from discriminating against employees or applicants based on genetic information.n1 
Some in opposition to this act said that there was no proof that any such discrimination was 
occurring and that discrimination based on genetic information is rare.112 Congress relied 
primarily on three individual examples of genetic discrimination, all of which arguably could 
have relied on relief claims under Title VII or the American with Disabilities Act.113 Therefore, 
Congress seemed to preemptively pass GINA without solid statistics or any strong evidence for 
its need .114 
Though GINA protects against possible discrimination based on genetic information, 
there are some downsides of GINA having been preemptively passed.115 One negative is it is 
nearly impossible to measure the Act's effectiveness without prior statistics.116 Therefore, 
discovering whether the legislation has actually protected anyone is nearly impossible.117 
Another consequence of Congress passing GINA preemptively is that GINA "may fail to 
109 Jessica Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 63 
V AND. L. REv. 439, 465-66 (20 1 0), available at http://www .vanderbiltlawreview .org/articles/20 1 0/03/Roberts-
Preempting-Discrimination-63-Vand.-L.-Rev.-439-201 O.pdf. 
110 Id. 
111 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of2008, Information for Researchers and Health Care 
Professionals, HHS (Apr. 6, 2009), available at 
http://www.genome.gov/Pages/PolicyEthics/GeneticDiscrimination/GINAinfoDoc.pdf. 
112 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of2008: Hearing on H.R. 493 Before the H (include specific house 
committee)., 11 Oth Cong. Page# if applicable (2007) (introductory remarks by Hon. Louise M. Slaughter of New 
York). 
113 Roberts, supra note 115, at 465-66. 
114Id. 
115 Id 
116 Id 
117 Id 
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alleviate (or may even legitimize) fears of genetic-information discrimination."118 Because 
Congress passed GINA before genetic discrimination affected many people, it seems possible 
that GINA raises more awareness about genetic discrimination than is desirable,119 lncluding 
generating fears of discrimination that did not previously exist.120 Rather than protecting and 
assuaging peoples' fears, it creates and stimulates the necessity of that fear.121 
GINA provides a comparison for the legislation banning employers from requesting 
social media passwords, at both the state and congressional levels. Like GINA, this recent 
password legislation does not have much empirical evidence, and relies heavily on anecdotal 
personal stories.122 Without much data, therefore, the password legislation seems also to be 
preemptive, and thus encounters those same problems that GINA does. Typically, and in the 
past, discriminatory legislation was passed retroactively.123 
C. Employers' Disincentives 
Employers open themselves up to lawsuits by looking into online information, 
specifically by viewing private personal information. 124 Employees or applicants could bring suit 
against the employer for using private information in the hiring or firing process on various bases 
including religion, sexual orientation, disability, or marital status,. 125 If an applicant is not hired 
after providing social media access, that applicant can later claim that said information was the 
reason. 
126 These employers, who review online information or require social media passwords, 
open themselves up to claims ranging from discrimination and retaliation to constitutional or 
118Jd 
119 See id 
120 Roberts, supra note II5, at 465-66. 
121 ld at 490. 
122 ld. 
123 ld at 457. 
124 Hickman, supra note II, at 9. 
125 Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
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tort-based privacy issues. 127 For example, Title VII states that it is unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.128 The First Amendment also 
protects freedom of speech; and freedom of religion.129 In addition, one of the four torts that 
falls under the rubric of invasion of privacy is intrusion upon seclusion, which addresses acts of 
intrusion into a victim's zone ofprivacy.130 
There have been several examples of employers not hiring a job applicant, and that 
applicant then raising a claim of discrimination because of discovered online information.131 
While the cases do not arise specifically from employers requesting private passwords, they do 
involve employers discovering an applicant or employee's personal information from online 
resources.132 
Gaskellv. University of Kentucky, 2010 WL 4867630 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2010), involves 
a discrimination claim under Title VII. 133 Gaskell alleged the university rejected him after the 
hiring committee found information on his religious views during an Internet search.134 Though 
this case does not involve requesting online passwords, it shows that even a basic Internet search 
opened the employer to liability based on the information discovered. 135 In the end, the judge 
denied cross-motions for summary judgment, and the case would have proceeded to further trial 
if it had not settled for $125,000.136 Although this case settled, it reveals that a triable issue of 
127 See generally, id. 
128 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. 
129 USCA CONST Amend. I. 
130 Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 652B (1977). 
131 See Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2011); Gaskell v. Univ. of Kentucky, No. 09-244, 2010 WL 
4867630 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 23, 2010); see also Alvarez & Ruff, supra note 99. 
132 See Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2011); Gaskell v. Univ. of Kentucky, 2010 WL 4867630 (E.D. Ky. 
Nov. 23, 2010); see also Alvarez & Ruff, supra note 99. 
133 See Gaskell, 2010 WL 4867630. 
134 Gaskell, 2010 WL 4867630, at *3. 
135 See generally, id. 
136 I d. at * 1; A Reminder to Hiring Committees: Don't Google the Candidates?, PrawsBlawg (Aug. 29, 20 12), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/getting_ ajob _on_ the_law _teaching_ market/. 
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fact can exist in a discrimination claim from discovered online information. 137 Therefore, an 
employee or applicant could raise a discrimination claim under Title VII, the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, or the Americans with Disabilities Act from information discovered during 
a search using their personal passwords. 138 
A second example is Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259 (8th Cir. 2011),139 which involved 
the University of Iowa's College of Law and its failure to hire a writing instructor, whose 
political beliefs were available online. 140 In the end, the court found that Wagner141, the 
applicant, had presented enough evidence of discrimination that the case could be brought to a 
jury. 142 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit applied the following test: 
In political discrimination cases, nonpolicymaking employees have the 
threshold burden to produce sufficient direct or circumstantial evidence 
from which a rational jury could fmd that political affiliation was a 
substantial or motivating factor behind the adverse employment action. At 
that point the employer must articulate a nondiscriminatory basis for the 
adverse employment action and prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that it would have been taken without regard to plaintiffs political 
affiliation. 143 
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit determined that a typical nondiscrimination test should also apply 
for cases in which discriminatory information is discovered through online means.144 And thus, 
the First Amendment with its political freedom and freedom of speech provisions applies to 
137 A Reminder to Hiring Committees: Don't Google the Candidates?, PrawsBlawg (Aug. 29, 2012), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/getting ajob on the law teaching market/. 
138 - - - - - -I d. 
139 See Wagner, 664 F.3d. at 264. 
140 I d. at 264. 
141 Teresa Wagner, the plaintiff in this case, was later arrested for drunken driving in 2013. Police say Wagner was 
arrested when she failed field sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test showed her blood-alcohol content to be 
above the legal limit. CBS 2 IOWA, February 13,2013, 
http://www .cbs2iowa.cornlshared/newsroornltop stories/videos/kgan vid 14208.shtml. 
142 Jd.at274-75. - - -
143 ld. at 270 (quoting Rodriguez-Rios v. Cordero, 138 F.3d 22, 24 (1st Cir.l998). 
144Jd. 
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online information, and could also apply to information discovered during a search with an 
employee's or applicant's password to information available via social media.145 
In short, employers are already incentivized not to require passwords from applicants or 
employees because of the possibility of lawsuits.146 Even a simple Google or Facebook public 
search can yield discoverable information that can lead to a claim against the employer if that 
person is not hired or fired.147 Some employers may not heed these warnings. However, those 
employers expose themselves to an applicant's or employee's claim, as evidenced by Gaskell 
and Wagner.148 The strategy that the employer uses in the hiring process or when reviewing 
employees will depend on how much risk the employer is willing to assume. 
Part III: Analysis 
Combining the three primary arguments from above- (1) that the legislation is difficult 
to enforce; (2) that the laws are preemptively passed; and (3) that an employer should be 
protecting itself from lawsuits by not asking for any employees' or job applicants' passwords for 
any private information that could lead to discrimination or privacy claims-this Note argues 
that legislative efforts banning access to employers' access to passwords is mistaken. First, this 
section explains why legislators should not be passing these acts. Second, the section determines 
that legislators should, at this time, regulate only within the public sector, rather than 
overreaching into the private sector, which has not shown a need for regulation regarding online 
passwords. Overall, because these legislative measures have not been proven to help many 
people, and because history teaches that government entities would be the primary violators of 
these laws, the legislators would be better off setting a standard for internal government hiring 
145ld 
146 Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
147 See Wagner, 664 F.3d at 264; Gaskell, insert year WL 4867630, at *1; see also Alvarez & Ruff, supra note 99. 
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and firing rather than broadly requiring employers to adhere to a law that most are not breaking 
in the first place. 
A. Setting the Stage for Legislative Ineffectiveness 
When it comes to the enforcement of the acts, many state laws have different 
enforcement mechanisms, ranging from administrative enforcement to criminal offenses.149 
Some other states have no enforcement written into the act at all. 150 Thus, enforcement 
mechanisms and remedies vary state to state. This hodgepodge of enforcement methods not only 
make it confusing for those individuals looking to bring claims against an employer or company, 
but also make it difficult for attorneys and courts to handle these types of claims. 
An individual could either bring a claim in state courts or federally under the Password 
Protection Act. These different opportunities could allow for various remedies for the plaintiff, 
and assorted penalties for the employer.151 These differences would generate confusion for 
individuals when preparing to bring a claim, as to which jurisdiction would be best. Additionally, 
the differences would allow for preference as to certain courts or jurisdictions for each party, as a 
state court or federal court might be more beneficial in a particular remedy or penalty for a given 
party. 
These differences in enforcement mechanisms and penalties also create problems for the 
legal system overall. Because of the different enforcement provisions, certain jurisdictions are 
likely to be more favorable to one party than another. Thus, the other party would likely try and 
remove the case to an alternate, more advantageous district. Therefore, the varying enforcement 
provisions would likely lead to a high number of motions to transfer venue or remove to federal 
court. That would create a backlog of administrative issues for courts to handle. Because of the 
149 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
150 ld. 
151Jd 
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increase in time and labor, this backlog would also likely lead to increased attorneys fees for the 
parties involved. 
Enforcement also becomes a problem with respect to what entity would be in charge of 
regulating the activities of the employers. In one sense, it seems impractical for an existing 
government department to take on inspection of every company, organization, employer, and 
school in a certain district. This is especially the case since the U.S. government does not have a 
regulatory body for privacy invasions of online information and since the DOL has admitted to 
handling other laws ineffectively .152 Additionally, in this economy, it is simply not reasonable to 
create a new government body to oversee a new act. Local, state and federal governments all 
lack the ability to employ people to act as a watchdog over every company to make sure it does 
not request disclosure of passwords. Additionally, in this economy, it is simply not reasonable 
for a single entity to police an employer, especially when the overall number of government 
employees, both at the state and federal levels, is decreasing. 153 With a decline in the number of 
federal inspectors and the lack of any non-governmental agency to fulfill this role, it is ill-
advised to require an agency already stretched thin yet still charged with enforcing hundreds of 
federal laws and regulations as well as the oversight of every federal employment law, to now 
review every employment application form in the nation to ensure that the employer is not 
asking for social media passwords in order to quell a problem for which there is no empirical 
152 See Ryan Moshell, ... And then there was one: The outlook for a self-regulatory United States amidst a global 
trend toward comprehensive data protection, 37 TX. TECH. L. REV. 357 (2005); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DOL 
Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2006, Performance and Accountability Report (2006). 
153 G. Scott Thomas, Government employment drops by 162,800 jobs, THE BUSINESS JOURNALS (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/on-numbers/scott-thomas/2012/08/government-employment-drops-by-
162800.html; See generally, RICHARD A. POSNER, A F AlLURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF'08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION, (Harvard Univ. Press 2009). 
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evidence to show that it even exists.154 Generally speaking, the funding that is necessary to 
monitor companies is not available at this time. 155 
Without proof that other applicants or employees have been affected by policies invading 
personal password information, it seems that legislators acted before it was necessary to create a 
solution to a false problem to please their constituents. If the only occurrences were individuals 
discussing their stories via the media, the government legislatures have based countless hours of 
writing and proposing this legislation on media firestorm. Seemingly, it would have been much 
easier, faster, and simpler for the state governments to self-regulate their own policies before 
assuming most other companies are also requesting passwords. But, with the statistics currently 
available, evidence showing a need for the password legislation does not present itself, at least 
not for the private sector. Thus, it appears that this social media legislation was passed 
preemptively, without the crucial proof or need for protection. 
A good example of the problem of preemptive legislative action is GINA. 156 Since its 
passage, several complaints over the passage of GINA have arisen.157 Without strong statistics to 
support the reasoning for GINA and its passage, it becomes nearly impossible to measure the 
effectiveness of the acts.158 Also, GINA may also have legitimized fears regarding discrimination 
based on genetic information, because it publicized the fear of something that was not much 
discussed previously .159 Thus, there arise several issues with preemptive legislation, as 
exemplified by GINA. Though no real problems have emerged since GINA's passage, it is not 
clear whether it has accomplished anything. The time and money spent to pass this law could 
154Jd 
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have been used elsewhere. Thus, like GINA, the laws banning employers' access to online 
information are preemptive and raise many of the same concerns. Further, this preemptive 
passage of such acts may not be the most effective means of preventing problems regarding 
online discrimination. 
Finally, legislators are misusing time and resources in passing these social media laws 
because an employer should be protecting itself from lawsuits by not asking for any employee's 
or job applicant's passwords for any private information that could lead to discrimination or 
privacy claims. Employers that review online information, and especially those that gain access 
to private passwords, expose themselves to legal claims ranging from discrimination and Title 
VII to constitutional privacy and Fourth Amendment issues. 160 
Often times, for private sector employers, the threat of liability is more frightening than 
an unclear and unorganized means of enforcement mechanisms employed through the laws and 
bills.161 A company might rather pay a limited fine or penalty to the government for its wrongful 
actions rather than begin a protracted litigation process, which could involve paying a large sum 
to the plaintiff in addition to legal fees. Therefore, the basic fear of legal actions against an 
employer provides a better disincentive to those companies than laws that have various means of 
enforcement. 
B. Public Sector v. Private Sector Legislative Oversight 
Considering the three arguments from above, a trend emerges. That trend is that the cases 
involving password requests have stemmed primarily from local government entities. Because all 
the prior proof regarding issues with employers occurred in the public sector, there is no 
evidence pointing to a need for protection in the private sector. The state government positions, 
160 See generally Hirschfeld & Oliveira, supra note 8. 
161 Bernabei & Kabat, supra note 3, at 42. 
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and local school districts, have led to the publicity regarding the requirement to access private 
online information. Thus, legislators should be monitoring and regulating those public sector 
government agencies and schools, rather than passing widespread action that affects those 
without a need for it. 
Overreaching legislation can be dangerous. The legal system and the nature of judicial 
review are meant to protect against congressional overreaching.162 Specifically, many people fear 
that overreaching legislation takes away the rights of individuals in areas that have traditionally 
been protected by the Constitution and the courts. And, since private sector employees already 
have protections, the government may not be necessary or the best, most efficient means of 
enforcement, especially if by doing so it enters a new sphere of government regulation over 
private corporations. 
Overall, the legislators should be spending their time and the taxpayers' money in more 
efficient ways. The 112th Congress, from 2011-2012, was the least productive Congress on 
record in the United States, passing only near two percent of proposed bills.163 Whether the 
proposal and passage of these social media bills is just a means of enacting something, or 
whether the legislators legitimately believe that access to online information is a formidable 
problem, these laws are ineffective in their current form. Legislators should have first addressed 
the problem within the public sector. If online social media access becomes a larger and more 
widespread occurrence, then that is the time legislators should take action. 
Conclusion 
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2012, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-08-14/unproductive-congress-not-
passingbills/57060096/l. 
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In the end, the online privacy legislation is ineffective in protecting employees, 
applicants, and students. The fact that no clear statistics reveal that many people are affected by 
password requests, in addition to the fact that not many private sector employers are using this 
practice because of the threat of lawsuits is seemingly enough to show that these laws are not 
necessary within the private sector. Additionaily, the specit1c proposed laws, and the several that 
were passed, are preemptive because of the lack of evidence, and also lack effectual enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Rather, these various legislative measures seem to be preemptive in nature, and 
overreaching in their actions. Overreaching legislation spends unnecessary funds and takes a step 
beyond what may be allowed. Largely, these acts are not helping many people and are 
ineffective in their current state. This bill is not a solution to any real problem. And though it is 
seemingly preemptive, there will never be evidence of its actual effect because the problem was 
nonexistent. 
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